Abstract. In this paper, we give a new identity-based signcryption scheme based on pairings. It is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext and identity attack in the random oracle with the Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption [14] . It produces shorter ciphertext than any one of schemes [7] , [14] for the same plaintext and adapts to the bandconstrained scenario very well.
Introduction
The two fundamental services of public key cryptography are encryption and signing. Encryption provides confidentiality. Digital signatures provide authentication and non-repudiation. Often when we use one of these two services, we would like to use also the other. In 1997, Zheng [1] proposed a novel cryptographic primitive which he called as signcryption. The idea behind signcryption is to simultaneously perform signature and encryption in a logically single step in order to obtain confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrepudiation at lower computational cost than the traditional "signature then encryption"approach. In addition, this latter solution also expends the final ciphertext size. Several efficient signcryption schemes [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] have been proposed since 1997. Malone-Lee afterward extended the signcryption idea to identity-based cryptography and firstly presented an identity-based signcryption scheme [8] . Indeed, the concept of identity-based cryptography was proposed in 1984 by Shamir [16] . The idea behind identity-based cryptography is that the user's public key can be derived from arbitrary string (e-mail address, IP address combined to a user name,...) which identifies him in a non ambiguous way. This greatly reduces the problems with key management. This kind of system needs trusted authority called private key generator(PKG) whose task is to compute user's private key from user's identity information. Several identity-based signcryption schemes have been proposed so far, e.g. [7] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] .
Unfortunately, most of these schemes only operate on plaintexts of less than or equal to some fixed length.
In some situations, e.g. bandwidth-constrained scenario, it is desirable to shorten the length of ciphertext. In this paper we propose a new identity-based signcryption scheme which can deal with plaintexts of arbitrary length. For the same plaintext, it produces shorter ciphertext than any one of the schemes [7] , [14] and adapts to the bandwidth-constrained scenario very well.
The paper will proceed as follow. In section 2, we review some preliminaries used throughout this paper. Our scheme is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we compare our scheme with others. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Notations
Throughout this paper, we will use the following notations. |q| denotes the length of q in bits. If |q| = 0, q is denoted as φ. Z + denotes the set of natural numbers and {0, 1}
* denotes the the space of finite binary strings. Let [m] l1 denote the most significant l 1 bits of m and [m] l2 denote the least significant l 2 bits of m. We denote by a||b the string which is the concatenation of strings a and b. We also denote [x]= y if y ≤ x < y + 1 and y ∈ Z + . a b denotes the bitwise XOR of bit strings a and b. If G is a set, x ∈ R G denotes that x is an element randomly selected from G. Z q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}
Bilinear Map and Some Problems
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. The bilinear map is given as e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , which satisfies the following properties:
(1) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 , a, b ∈ Z q (2) Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1, in other words, the map does not send all pairs in G 1 × G 1 to the identity in G 2 ; (3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
We note that the weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves can be modified to create such bilinear maps. 
Obviously DBDHP is harder than MDBDHP. However, no known existing efficient algorithm can solve MDBDHP, to the best of our knowledge.
Framework of Identity-Based Signcryption Scheme
Signcryption schemes are made of five algorithms: Setup, Keygen, Signcrypt, Unsigncryp and TPVerify(if public verifiability is satisfied).
-Setup: Given a security parameter l, the private key generator(PKG)generates the system's public parameters params. 
Security Notions
Malone-Lee [8] extended notions of sematic security for public key encryption to identity-based signcryption schemes(IBSC). Sherman et al. slightly modified the definitions of these notions. these modified notions are indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext and identity attacks(IND-IBSC-CCIA) and existential unforgery of identity based signcryption under adaptive chosen message and identity attacks (EUF-IBSC-ACMIA). Now we recall the following definitions.
Definition 2. An identity-based signcryption scheme has the IND-IBSC-CCIA property if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
( In this definition, to obtain the non-repudiation property and to prevent a dishonest recipient to send a ciphertext to himself on Alice's behalf and to try to convince a third party that Alice was the sender, it is necessary for the adversary to be allowed to make a Keygen query on the forged message's recipient ID B .
Proposed Signcryption Scheme
Description of the Scheme
-Setup: Given a security parameter l ∈ Z + , the private key generator(PKG) chooses groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order
n (here n is the key length of symmetric cipher ),
l2 . It also choose a secure symmetric cipher (E, D) and a master-key s ∈ Z * q , and computes P pub = sP and g= e(P ,P pub ). The system's public parameters are P= {q,
-Keygen: Given identity ID, the PKG computes Q ID = H 1 (ID) and the private key
To send a message m (|E (·) (m)| ≥ l 2 ) to Bob, Alice follows the steps below. 1 , r, S) , Bob follows the steps below.
1.
-TPVerify: On receiving (k, m, σ), the third party follows the steps below.
1. Compute r 0 = H 3 (r||c 1 ) and m) ), then we sign message c by Fangguo Zhang et al's identity-based signature scheme. Since the length of paper is limited, we don't discuss it any more here. Throughout this paper, we assume |E (·) (m)| ≥ l 2 if message m need to be signcrypted. -Remark 2: In the unsigncryption process, f ∈ Z + is turned into a bit string f . If |f | < l, we will fill (l − |f |) zeros in the left of bit string f .
The consistency of this scheme is easy to verify by the bilinear pairing. It is forward-secure, in the sense that only Bob (and PKG) can recover m: knowledge of Alice's private keys s IDA and d IDA is insufficient to compute k. It is also publicly verifiable because, when verifying the messages origin by TPVerify algorithm, any third party does not depend on any private information. In order to convince someone that Alice is the sender of plaintext m, the receiver just have to forward the ephemeral decryption k to the third party. 
Security Result Theorem 1. In the random oracle model (the hash functions are modeled as random oracles), if there is an IND-IBSC-CCIA adversary A that succeeds with an advantage when running in a time t and asking at most
where T e denotes the computation time of the bilinear pairing, T pm denote the computation time of exponentiation over G 2
Proof. see the appendix. The existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages and identity attacks derives from the security of Fangguo Zhang ea al's identity-based signature scheme [15] . By arguments similar to those in [17] , one can show that an attacker that is able to forge a signcrypted message must be able to forge a signature for Fangguo Zhang ea al's identity-based signature scheme.
Comparison of Schemes
Among these schemes [7] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , only schemes [7] , [14] use the more general symmetric cipher and seems to process messages of arbitrary length. So, in table 1 below, we compare our scheme with schemes [7] , [14] in terms of the length of the ciphertext which they produce and the number of the dominant operations required by them. In table we use mls, exps, and pcs as abbreviations for point multiplications in G 1 , exponentiations in G 2 and pairing computations respectively. In table, we denote all the ciphertexts, which are produced by encrypting the plaintext m with symmetric cipher in different and equal length keys and which are of equal length, as c for convenience, since we only consider the ciphertext length not the content of the ciphertext. 
Conclusion
We proposed a new identity-based signcryption scheme. It produces shorter length ciphertext than any one of schemes [7] , [14] for the same plaintext. It has the IND-IBSC-CCIA property in random oracle with assumption that MDBDHP is hard to decide. Additionally, it is an interesting problem to construct an identity-based signcryption schemes which produces shorter length ciphertext than ours for the same plaintext.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
The distinguisher B receives a random instance (P, a 1 P, a 2 P, a 3 P, a
−1
3 P, h) of the MDBDH problem. Its goal is to decide whether h = e(P, P )
or not. B will run A as a subroutine and act as A's challenger in the IND-IBSC-CCIA game. Here note that we only discuss the case E (·) (m) = l 2 , the discussion of the case E (·) (m) > l 2 is similar to that of the case E (·) (m) = l 2 and is omitted. B needs to maintain lists 4 , and L 5 that are initially empty and are used to keep track of answers to queries asked by A to oracle H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , F 1 and F 2 . We assume that the following assumptions are made.
(1) A will ask for H 1 (ID) before ID is used in any Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt and Keygen queries.
(2) A will not ask for Keygen(ID) again if the query Keygen(ID) has been already issued before.
(3) Ciphertext returned from a Signcrypt query will not be used by A in an U nsigncrypt query.
At the beginning of the game, B gives A the system parameters with P pub = a 3 P (a 3 is unknown to B and plays the role of the PKG's master key in the game).
-H 1 queries: When A makes an H 1 query on identity, B checks the list L 1 , If an entry for the query is found, the same answer will be given to A; otherwise, a value d j from F * q will be randomly chosen and d j P will be used as the answer, the query and the answer will then be stored in the list L 1 . The only exception is that B has to randomly choose one of the H 1 queries from A, say the i th query, and answers H 1 (ID i ) = a 2 P for this query. Since a 2 P is a value in a random instance of the MDBDH problem, it does not affect the randomness of the hash function H 1 .
-H 2 , H 3 , F 1 and F 2 queries: When A makes queries on these hash functions, B checks the corresponding list. If an entry for the query is found, the same answer will be given to A; otherwise, a randomly generated value will be used as an answer to A, the query and the answer will then be stored in the list. ·) , B has to repeat the same process using another r 0 until the corresponding (k 1 , ·) is not any entry in L 3 (Note that: this process repeats at most 3q R times as L 3 can contain at most 3q R . B needs to compute two pairings at most for each iteration of the process).
Then Taking into account all the probabilities that B will not fail its simulation, the probability that A chooses to be challenged on the pair (ID j , ID i ), and also the probability that A wins the IND-IBSC-CCIA game, we have Regarding the time complexity, it can be verified by counting the number of pairing operations required to answer all queries.
